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Was 1948 a turning point in the relation between agrarian capital and the state? Indeed
- according to the notoriously impermanent maps that many historians have drawn. But
stop, look back, look left, and look back again - and the crossroads of apartheid may
disappear.
Consider the usual story. From the 1920s, there was a growing farm labour shortage.
But the Native Affairs Department (NAO) adhered to its ethic of paternalistic protection,
and argued that a solution was 'above all dependent on farmers' preparedness to offer
higher wages'. It would not aid agriculturists 'if this entailed artificially cheapening the
price of labour'.1
During the urban booms of the 1930s and 1940s, labour tenants fled in droves to towns.
Among the farmers worst affected were those in the Transvaal, where labour tenancy
was 'the only form' of acquiring workers in the early 1930s.2 Landlords not only
demanded tighter influx control and labour bureaux: in 1945 the South African Agricul-
tural Union (SAAU) also urged a permanent separation of urban and rural workforces,
preventing full time farm workers from moving to town. But the state reflected the
interests of mining and manufacturing capital, and the proposals fell on deaf ears.
Indeed, the NAD continued to advise improved working conditions, and to divert black
labour to industry. Due partly to the state's 'reluctance' to become 'the pivot of forced
labour measures', Transvaal agriculturists deserted the United Party (UP) in the May
1948 elections.3
Almost immediately, the repressive apartheid regime began supporting capitalist
landlords. In 1949 legislation was amended to 'permit groups of farmers to recruit'
labour; a crucial bill establishing labour bureaux was drafted in consultation with the
SAAU, which was afforded a 'privileged hearing' in the NAD.4 Influx control was not
only tightened: from 1954 'petty offenders' were also hijacked to farms.5 The apartheid
state 'sought primarily to secure a stable labour supply for agriculture' by implementing
the SAAU's proposals - and by the late 1950s, apartheid had succeeded. Hence the
'coming to power of the Nationalist party...marked a turning point in the class struggle
in the countryside.'7
Although this story chimes agreeably with opposition to the apartheid state, it is also
economical with the truth. Some dates are dubious; numerous facts are fantasies; many
premises are perverse. But the silences are as disturbing as the sophisms. By focusing
on the Transvaal, this account attempts to address some of the problems of too much
politics chasing too little data.
First, a regional economic system shaped the consciousness of farmers and the
contours of state intervention. Subcontinental labour mobilization was 'perhaps the
single most important feature of the early industrialization of South Africa', and landlords
were all too aware that when 'the Native... is exploiting the farmer', 'the only way to
counteract this is to import labour.'8 Cries of 'labour shortage' in the 1930s culminated
not in requests for influx control - debt was far more potent than passes in tying workers
to farms - but in demands for apparatchiks' aid in procuring black immigrants.9 State
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intervention in the crisis in the 1940s peaked not in pious platitudes, but in facilitating
recruitment of foreigners by farmers, and in allocating aliens through labour bureaux.
Historically, both capital and labour have crossed international boundaries far more
readily than many South Africanlst scholars.
Second, many accounts of the farm labour crisis resemble Hamlet without the Prince.
Shortages were the breeding ground of recruiters, who repeatedly disrupted labour
bureaux, and thrived in precisely the circumstances that debilitated productive capital-
ists. But since an exploitable workforce is the single most significant factor in capitalist
accumulation - 'it is only labour that creates wealth', claimed the director of mine
recruiting - many wealthier farmers were forced to turn to these merchants of men.10
Partly in consequence, most 'large land- owners or financially strong farmers' were not
experiencing labour shortages in the late 1930s.11 Nor did their situation deteriorate
dramatically in the 1940s. 'Jan Smuts met sy regering was 'n pes vir ons boere', claimed
a relatively large Transvaal farmer, 'maar ons het darem tog kaffers gekry'.12
Finally, the dichotomy of paternalism and apartheid shrouds too many continuities. Far
from constantly urging upliftment of farm labourers, the NAD depressed foreign
workers' wages in the 1920s, and sanctioned a slave trade In the 1930s and '40s. Far
from failing to tackle the farm labour problem, pre-1948 administrations laid the
foundations on which apartheid built. South African Party (SAP) officials introduced a
labour bureau servicing landlords, Pact bureaucrats shanghaied convicts to farms, UP
civil servants initiated the brutal 'petty offenders' scheme and let agriculturists Invest in
Jails. For many large capitalist farmers, '1948' was not a turning point in state interven-
tion in the labour crisis.
RECRUITERS AND RECRUITED IN THE NORTHERN AND EASTERN
TRANSVAAL
If combined and uneven development characterizes capitalism, spectacular uneven-
ness is a distinguishing feature of southern Africa. Mineowners dominated the devel-
opment of a subcontinent but patchily penetrated by merchants; extremely
concentrated industries were worked by migrants whose homes were scattered
thousands of miles apart. Once these early patterns of capital accumulation had been
laid, late-developers acquired 'the privilege of historic backwardness'.13 In both South-
ern Rhodesia and South Africa, many agrarian and industrial capitalists skipped the
stage of primitive accumulation, and exploited foreign workers already gouged out of
the countryside by mineowners and colonial states.
From the 1910s to the 1950s, alien migrants heading for the Witwatersrand came above
all from the Rhodesias, Nyasaland and Portuguese East Africa.M In an attempt to reach
the highest wages in southern Africa, many walked hundreds or thousands of miles.
Their epic Journeys were guided by rudimentary maps, imprinted with the collective
experiences of all who had passed before. Notes had been placed in trees; secret signs
had been carved into bark; vernacular names of mines served as warning signals;
raft-like nests in trees provided nocturnal protection against man-eating lions. For
those exhausted by the rigours of their Odyssey, there were stop-overs - temporary
|obs on mines and farms, where workers saved enough for the next leg of the Journey,
then deserted and took to the road again.
Their tenacity was extraordinary, their courage enormous. Guided by an intelligence
system evolved by wary migrants - 'you must be very careful the place is watched by
the Police you must be clever about crossing the river, and you must do that in a hurry"
- many successfully negotiated both social and natural roadblocks.16 They evaded
recruiters, outwitted pass officers, and criss-crossed borders; they warded off wild
animals, traversed raging rivers and survived barren wastes. Finally, often banded
together in large gangs because 'they are strangers In a strange land', 7 they reached
the Limpopo. Usually, the river was fordable on foot for nine months of the year;
sometimes, crocodiles seized those too desperate to wait for summer floods to subside.
Malnourished survivors then hit the last two barriers which remained: the South African
state and labour recruiters hungry for 'Tropical Natives'.
Few questions, claimed the Director of Native Labour In 1925, had prickled with more
difficulties than black immigration into the Transvaal, 'which has been a long struggle
between the conflicting interests'.'8 The clashes occurred between capital and labour:
while farmers ogled cheap workers, black immigrants struggled to reach the Rand, and
white unionists fought to prohibit their entry. They occurred between sectors of capital:
who was entitled to corner these labourers • South Africans or Rhodesians, mineowners
or farmers, recruiting companies or freelance labour agents? Moreover, these conflicts
were refracted through the state - itself internally divided, itself straddling contradictory
Imperatives. Civil servants more sensitive to facilitating accumulation than to organizing
consent often stripped laws of their content; the state's drive for control in the future
constantly collided with capital's insistence on exploitation in the present.
Consequently, highly unstable compromises evolved. By the 1920s, mineowners had
been forced to fall back on their monopoly over southern Mozambicans after being
squeezed out of the 'tropical' labour market. Their rapacious labour agents - who had
transformed the far northern Transvaal into 'the most notorious centre of illegal
recruiting in the entire subcontinent' - had been forbidden to recruit foreigners.19 But
since farmers, together with their salaried servants, were completely exempt from any
rulings referring to 'recruitment', this was hardly a barrier to agents well versed in the
ways of lawless banditry. If touts either represented themselves as landlords' em-
ployees, or sold immigrants to farmers' agents, they too could brazenly ignore any
restrictions on foreign booty.
So In the early 1920s - as 'a devastating combination of inflation, drought and economic
recession forced thousands of Central Africa's Inhabitants to leave their villages in
search of employment' - aliens were channelled to agriculturists by mine recruiters, as
well as by agents extruded from the mines when the monopsonistic Native Recruiting
Corporation (NRC) was established.20 New accumulators in the countryside were
rearmed by an older arsenal of coercion and deceit, as experienced touts ran rings
round the fledgling state labour bureau which supposedly allocated aliens to northern
Transvaal employers. (Indeed, since the bureau was illicitly run by an NRC agent, many
northerners were recruited in the very belly of the beast.) Some labour agents lay in
wait at rivers; others simply "scoured the country from Pietersburg to the Limpopo and
collected up any Rhodesian or East Coast natives they could get hold of; yet others
bluntly informed Mozambican immigrants seeking mine work that 'the road to Johan-
nesburg is closed' but there is 'nice work that I know of on farms.21 Food was a
particularly potent weapon to deploy against starving immigrants: the most successful
recruiter had a food depot on a Limpopo ford; others sent wagonloads of provisions
to the border to feed and then force hungry Rhodesians southwards. Not that the initial
bribery lasted long: as aliens were passed down the chain of runners, subagents,
recruiters and farmers' 'servants', wages might halve, while the length of contracts
could double.
At a time when landlords' average annual income was about t160, who were these
agriculturists who posted off cheques for over four hundred pounds to purchase '12
months boys'?22 Most were based on maize and potato farms scattered around
Middelburg, Witbank, and Bethal • good farming land which was profitably close to the
Rand. Companies and partnerships ran some of these estates: black immigrants were
snapped up by a firm of 'General Merchants and Farmers', as well as by the notorious
Medalie Brothers, who extracted their pound of flesh from some 600 workers on three
farms.23 Immigrants were also greedily eyed by wealthy individuals, like the 'Mealie
King' Esrael Lazarus, the largest farmer in South Africa. With some ten estates and a
coal mine, he was a ruthless robber-baron running one of the greatest maize farming
operations in the world.24
For such men, procuring a large supply of cheap recruits was the single most important
prerequisite for survival as capitalist farmers in the periphery. Since land prices had
risen tenfold since the turn of the century, every acre available was frequently put to
the plough rather than wasted on tenants. But hired labour often constituted an
enormous 35 - 50% of running expenses excluding interest - and was almost the only
outlay partially controlled by farmers heavily dependent on imported equipment and
international markets. Only by minimizing labour costs could South African maize
farmers compete against those in the Argentine; only by maximising labour supplies
could they achieve high yields in a period when capital-intensive methods were far too
expensive. Having internalised the lesson that the 'main factors responsible for success
in maize farming are high yields per acre and low labour costs', they had a voracious
appetite for cheap workers.25
Unfortunately, their proximity to the Rand and distance from reserves enhanced the
bargaining power of their workers. According to many large eastern Transvaal farmers,
tenants supplying casual labour were 'absolutely impossible'. As for the 'rejects from
the mines' supplied by Rand-based farm labour companies recruiting in South Africa's
internal labour reservoirs, they were 'blind in one eye and their limbs more of less
impaired', or 'syphilis boys and mentally uncapables If many larger landlords were
reluctantly forced to rely heavily on these recruiting companies, they also eagerly
branched out into the relatively unknown sphere of freelance agents and foreign labour.
RISE AND FALL OF A LABOUR BUREAU, 1924-33
When the Pact government came to power in 1924, it made rather more concerted
efforts to stop this endeavour than had its SAP predecessor. One of the first moves of
this coalition was to prohibit clandestine immigration. Highveld capitalists objected in
no uncertain terms - the issue was a matter 'of life and death', wrote one lawyer
representing their interests. "Istly the Rhodesian boys are cheaper; and 2ndly the
supply is sure there being many of them in search of work.'27 Thirdly, he might have
added, politically vulnerable workers separated from their fellows by a linguistic
barricade were often more submissive; fourthly, they 'touched the pen' to longer
contracts than many South Africans; fifthly, unlike many indigenous blacks busy with
their own harvests, 'Rhodesian boys' were available for reaping.
No capitalist state can ride roughshod over the accumulation requirements of large-
scale employers. Since it was impossible to alienate these landlords, yet desirable to
erode their monopoly of northerners in a boom period of growing farm labour short-
ages, impossible to stop immigration without creating a chain of police posts, yet
desirable to mollify white labour, a compromise evolved. Clandestinely, with no legal
basis, and using a semi- private bank account, an attempt was made to establish
complete state control over the distribution of northerners through the Rhodesian
Native Labour Depot at Louis Trichardt. On the one hand, regulations were tightened
to exclude farmers from independent access to foreigners. On the other hand, immi-
grants descending on the verminous compound at the rate of 250 a month - often as
victims of pass laws or as the booty of constables policing local trains - were informed
they had a choice. Provided they passed a perfunctory medical examination - the
grossly malnourished were simply dumped back over the border - they could either be
repatriated, or be sent to farms for a year to earn a maximum of 30s. a month.
This contract length was double that of the workers supplied by Rand-based recruiting
companies. The wage - after farmers promptly cut it to 20-25S. - was half. Although the
Depot was 'run purely on business lines', ft cleared such embarrassingly large profits
that its capitation fee was soon slashed to less than 50% of the companies' tariff.28 In
short, the labour bureau had two outstanding advantages over private recruiters: it
dramatically depressed the conditions of workers, and radically reduced the profits of
middlemen.
In this boom period of relatively high maize prices and rapidly expanding production,
demand for its merchandise was consequently considerably greater than supply.
Unperturbed, officials devised a system of allocating northerners which grotesquely
symbolized their view of immigrants as commodities. Slips with the names of some
seventy approved employers were kept in a ballot box - and a lottery was held. 'When
natives are available, a draw is made from the box, and the lucky farmer supplied'.29
From aliens to be captured to prizes to be won • in a world where men were
merchandise, such transitions were commonplace.
In theory, smaller farmers would be the main beneficiaries of this raffle of black bodies;
in practice, large capital swept the board. Although the social prejudices of senior
officials lubricated this change of gear - 'Judging from his voice he is a man of some
standing..If you could possibly let him have, say, five boys as a special concession' -
it occurred largely for all too material reasons.30 Only wealthier farmers could afford the
fees and forwarding costs; only very large landlords would accept an 'allotment' of
twenty-five labourers whatever the season. Smaller cost-conscious farmers frequently
requested 'picannins only and not big natives'; they usually wanted only a couple of
workers.31 But few children had walked several hundred miles, and immigrants valued
solidarity too highly to agree to split into smaller gangs. Pact policy had foundered on
the rocks of black resistance and economic reality.
In addition to the handful of large landlords employing northerners since the 1910s,
those who patronised the Tropical Labour Bureau' were drawn from a second wave
of eastern Transvaal maize farmers. Although they farmed on a smaller scale, they too
obtained South African 'joinboys' from recruiting companies (while cannily ensuring
that the bulk of their labourers were foreigners.) The majority lived in Bethal - one of the
few South African districts where it was possible to farm and prosper. And large
numbers were Jewish refugees from Russia, tightly integrated into a world of non-ag-
rarian and considerably more profitable capital. Some were simultaneously moneylen-
ders; others were associated with the more stolid financial base of insurance com-
panies; many had in the past or present doubled as merchants. Due to this 'combined
development', the majority had leapfrogged over their fellows. Instead of standard
grade products, they grew choice table potatoes; in place of monoculture, they
produced two or more crops a year; escaping backwardness, they ran farms as 'an
industrial concern'; avoiding tenants, they hired wage labour 'on a commercial basis'.32
Not that many smaller farmers appreciated this vastly accelerated progress. The 'Jews
have placed large orders with this department for boys and by so doing they are
depriving the poor and needed farmer from obtaining Natives', wrote one landlord
bitterly; 'the Jews have possession of nearly all trading stands on mines and Hotels
etc. and now the boys.
In the vanguard of those treating people as property were the largest and wealthiest
capitalists. Landlords who had spent hundreds of pounds to secure black workers
clawed back their cash with a ruthlessness probably unrivalled among Transvaal
farmers. For one thing, workers had to repay any advances made at the time of
recruitment, repay the cost of railing them to their place of exploitation, and repay
recruiters' rake-offs through low or non-existent wages. For another, indirect expendi-
ture was cut to the bone. Although immigrants were often emaciated (or, as farmers
viewed it, 'it was quite four months before we had any use from them') their diet usually
consisted of grossly inferior mealie meal and almost inedible potatoes. They 'must take
the rejects or un-marketabte potatoes cut in digging or stabbed with the forks', claimed
Sam Medalie indignantly. He had caught blacks cooking potatoes stolen from a bag
earmarked for the profits of the market rather than the stomachs of workers as he crept
up at midnight on the compound.34
If these rural accumulators had emulated the mines in their systems of social control,
they also debased their borrowings to accommodate far more primitive conditions. The
compounds were often locked, guarded and behind barbed wire fences; retention of
both wages and passes also helped curb desertion. Bloody assaults were endemic;
brutal murders were far from infrequent. The 'economics of death' suited farmers who
relied on an endless stream of replaceable migrants. During frosty highveld winters,
some workers were clad only in thin cotton blankets and loin cloths; others had no
clothes because these had been confiscated to prevent desertion. The cold took ill, the
weaker caught pneumonia, and the older died, while employers claimed they were
'shaming' and a 'shambuck' would send them back to work.3
For labourers, the system united the sins of both slavery and capitalism with the
blessings of neither. Although many workers described their plight in the vocabulary of
slavery, their protest was rooted In that transitional world where waged labourers were
bought and sold. They struck, rioted, and marched to police stations to complain; above
all, they deserted. Since many immigrants had doubtless regarded the eastern Trans-
vaal as but one more temporary halt in their long stop-go |oumey to the Rand, they
frequently fled in large groups, the enterprising having already reappropriated their
contracts and passes.
What were the implications of this rural resistance for the labour bureau? Within less
than a year of its establishment, 'tropical natives' were 'deserting wholesale', and
querulous landlords were complaining that labour agents 'guarantee desertions which
you people do not do'.37 In addition, the depot was disrupted by unauthorised recruiters
- who longed to 'break up your organisation'. (Indeed, one labour agent boasted that
he alone had recruited 2,700 'tropicals'in 1925 - only slightly fewer than all those
distributed by the depot.38) But the greatest blow was struck by blacks crossing the
border - which was badly policed, easy to cross, and meandered for 400 miles through
desolate bushveld terrain. Moving both west and east, Immigrants simply changed their
ports of entry. By late 1925 the numbers were noticeably falling; by 1929 the depot had
almost ceased to function.
The coup de grace was delivered by the depression. Agricultural prices collapsed; rural
trade came to a standstill; maize farmers faced financial ruin. By late 1930, only six
employers were still interested In the lottery; even they were reluctant prizewinners 'as
we are overstocked'.39 In 1933, as drought compounded the effects of economic
devastation, the depot was closed.
Although capital no longer sought labour, a 'flood of unemployed released by the
impact of the Depression on the rural areas of Central Africa' streamed into South
Africa.40 By 1931 some 65% of the desperate men crossing the northern border came
from Nyasaland, that rural slum of the British Empire and notorious labour reservoir of
Africa. As both foreign and South African men driven by the spectre of starvation
forced their way onto the Rand, the sheer size of the swollen reserve army of labour
concentrated bureaucratic minds on the disadvantages of idle immigrants. From
1930-36, vast sums were spent in a grim effort to export thousands of unemployed
black aliens back to their peripheries. Many could not bid farewell to their families before
they were forcemarched to trains; some died on the |ourney to the nearest dumping
spot; others were seized by wild animals when ditched on the road. As one hostile
group of 'Nyasaland Natives' observed in 1932, the state might as well 'gather us all,
and open the gate to the zoo, and let to be devourd By your lions'.42
It was the end of an era of ruthless restructuring of a reserve army of labour. Northerners
had been expelled from the mines In the 1910s, partially prised from the grip of recruiters
in the 1920s, then thrown out of the country when spurned by farmers in the early 1930s.
But the depression was succeeded by the boom of the later '30s and '40s - during
which northerners who had fled the peripheries for South Africa increased sixfold. They
flowed back onto the mines, filled the lorries of labour agents, displaced black South
Africans from domestic service, and featured as the cornerstone of the state's attempt
to address the farm labour crisis. This time, history repeated itself not as farce, but as
tragedy, with an unprecedented increase in savagery.
'BLACK SLAVE TRAFFIC ON A GRAND SCALE'
During the depression, numerous larger highveld farmers kept their heads |ust above
water by switching from recruiting companies to cheaper freelancers, and from clan-
destine immigrants to convicts and children. By introducing the first large-scale farm
labour scheme affecting black prisoners, the state had tried to shift the burden of
capitalism's crisis onto the shoulders of the most vulnerable sector of society. Few
whites cared a whit about its utter illegality: Bethal landlords exulted over their ability to
extract at least 25% more work from short-term convicts: the Prisons Department
gleefully pocketed the entire wages of the victims it sold. The NAD lagged not far
behind, with administrative relaxations regarding black child labour which flouted not
only morality but also the legislature. 'What authority' - demanded a recruiting corpor-
ation anxiously seeking legal grounds for packing twelve year olds off to farms - had
NAD officials 'to relax a Law or Act of Parliament?'. What authority indeed - except that
of bureaucrats in the modern capitalist state, where typically the 'most important part
of the decision- making process...occurs at the executive and administrative levels'.44
But as the pall of the depression lifted, civil servants diverted prisoners from farms to
public works. Moreover, robber-recruiters who had stolen an entire generation of
children rapidly ran out of loot. By the mid-1930s, 'practically all the picannins' had
disappeared from the traditional hunting ground of northern Transvaal agents serving
eastern Transvaal farmers. By early 1936, although old customers of the labour bureau
besieged recruiters specializing in child labour with telegrams crying 'SOS for Labour',
there was none to be had.45 Even adults were sparse, since the sluice gates preventing
movement from reserves to the Rand had been opened in response to industrial
expansion. And at this point, foreigners were reinserted on the agenda of agrarian
capital and the state.
At the start of the greatest mining boom for fifty years, a policy of twenty years standing
had been rescinded. From 1933, northerners could be recruited by the Chamber of
Mines. In mid-1936, on the eve of harvesting a bumper crop, and at a time when maize
prices had risen to their highest level for nearly a decade, labour-starved eastern
Transvaal landlords demanded a similar concession. The Pact government had been
replaced and so should its policies forbidding recruitment of foreigners by farmers, they
argued; they wanted renewed access to 'die skepsels wat oor die grens kom
These 'Mealie Kings' packed a considerable economic punch - the preceding year, a
mere 6% of maize farmers had harvested over half the crop.47 Yet the UP government
was also concerned about domestic control and foreign legitimacy. Allegedly, it would
be dangerous to have 'all these strangers on our hands when the next period of
depression comes'; moreover, forcible recruiting near the border might complicate
relations with Rhodesian authorities.48 As a compromise was hammered out, adminis-
trators imposed a string of conditions that would establish a recruiting- free buffer zone
stretching 20 miles back from the border, and would ensure the ejectment of 'these
strangers' from the land once their six months of exploitation was over.
However, as economic upturn developed into Industrial boom, and as Transvaal
landlords squeezed by uneven development howled for labour, the state beat a hasty
retreat from almost every condition. These sky-rocketed the price of aliens to 110 each;
since wages had been rammed down to t 1 a month, grasping farmers saw no prospect
'om die bedrag van die Naturel se lone terug te kry nie Undoubtedly, this economic
logic would defeat even the most predatory of landlords, so officialdom cut the Gordian
knot by letting farmers ignore repatriation. As significantly, they and their so-called
servants obtained exclusive rights to the 'zone', where they could legally procure all
foreigners except 'the Portuguese' notionally earmarked for the mines.
Since the influx of northerners had transformed the 'zone' into 'the actual cream of
South Africa' for recruiters, the gourmets of cheap labour lost no time in gorging
themselves.50 Some large landlords appeared in person with fleets of lorries; others,
like Lazarus, sccambled for white agents who in turn appointed battalions of African
runners. But as the economic spring of 1936 developed into the recessionary winter of
1937-39, even freelance recruiters were too costly for many members of the second
wave of easten Transvaal farmers. After failing to persuade officialdom to procure
foreign workers for them -'trying to get the boys free', claimed a recruiter sourly - they
brazenly formed a co- operative which traded in black bodies.51 Like larger recruiting
corporations, this Bethal labour company was soon clamouring for the same privileges
as wealthier individual farmers. Throwing concern about clashes with Rhodesian
authorities to the wind, civil servants opened the zone to all and sundry in 1937.
By this stage - and for years to come - recruiting in the northern Transvaal was at least
as violent and anarchic as during the early days of 'bodysnatching' for the mines. By
the late 1930s, some 2,500 Rhodesian and Nyasa immigrants were crossing the border
near Messina each month; Mozambicans were also entering in their thousands. Their
routes were eagerly traced by innumerable recruiters and runners, who intercepted
gangs in Bechuanaland, penetrated hundreds of miles into Southern Rhodesia,
snapped up Mozambicans in Portuguese East Africa, and grimly patrolled South African
roads after nightfall in their lorries. They relentlessly exploited the restrictions imposed
by the state on prohibited immigrants - promising permits to the passless, Rhodesian
identities to the 'Portuguese', and police intervention for the recalcitrant. Those working
for large labour companies waved the magic wand of Johannesburg depots: few
immigrants realised how quickly they would be rerouted from eGoll to the farms. In
addition, many recruiters found their past experiences in the army, policeforce or
compounds particularly helpful. In the context of cut-throat competition, they press-
ganged women and 'Portuguese Piccannins', kidnapped northerners who escaped
only by throwing themselves off lorries, and dumped Nyasa immigrants suffering from
pneumonia 'outside in the veld to die to make way for more sufferers likely to live.' They
also fought over possession of gangs, "prosecute[d] each other for "theft" of these
human beings' and channelled their booty largely to landlords willing to pay the highest
price.52
Although officials publicly boasted that freeing farmers from recruiting controls over
foreigners had greatly reduced their labour shortage, they privately admitted to helping
'the few rich ones at the expense of the vast majority of poor ones', and to sanctioning
"black birding" on a large scale'.53 As others less delicately expressed it in 1940, 'the
callousness towards the Immigrants shown by the higher officials of the Native Affairs
Department savours more of the old Arab regime'.54 Yet the war years were no time to
end a slave-trade: not when the country was plagued with maize shortages, and farmers
were fettered by increasingly fractious and costly workers. Not, too, when the demand
for cheap recruits had Increased dramatically. Spurred on by the 1937 Marketing Act -
which by inflating domestic prices made working-class Africans compensate maize
farmers for exporting at a loss - and galvanized by soaring wartime prices - which
reached levels last seen in the early 1920s - 'the four fifths of the Maize farmers who
grow only one fifth of the crop' had begun to expand production.55
After bitter battles, representatives of this third wave of farmers had taken over the
recruiting co-operative in the eastern Transvaal. By the early 1940s, Afrikaner nationalist
sentiments infused this Bethal Boerearbeidsvereniging, which had blacklisted several
larger English-speaking capitalists because their barbarous regimes exacerbated the
district's labour shortage. Yet men like Sam Medalie were never loath to explore new
ways of abusing cheap workers. Challenged from below by upstart Afrikaners, and
neglected from above by recruiting companies more interested in booming industries,
scores of predominantly Jewish entrepreneurs simply formed their own co-operative
recruiting groups, which mushroomed uncontrollably in the zone.
As farmers greedy for labour multiplied - and as tenants became townsmen and labour
reservoirs became hunting grounds for the army - the scramble for vulnerable foreign-
ers intensified. In 1944,100% of the recruits of a large farmers' group came from the
Rhodesias and Nyasaland, as did 99% of those caught in the trawl of the Boerearbeids-
vereniging, and two-thirds of those seized by large Johannesburg-based labour
companies.56 The following year, over 18.000 northerners - some 75% of those entering
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the country - were passed along a chain of runners and recruiters to Transvaal and
Free State farmers. In Bethal alone, the number of contracted labourers increased
almost fivefold in the decade after 1937. Indeed, so many of the recruits here were
foreigners that some large estates were simply called 'Nyasaland'.58
Immediately after the war, the demand for aliens soared as production records were
smashed in the eastern Transvaal following favourable weather and reinsertion into the
world market. And the barometer of the slave trade rose by leaps and bounds.
Confronted by armed whites and blacks impersonating the police and demanding 'to
pas'.innumerable northerners and many South Africans were 'forced to take a join'.59
They were dragooned into service - after beatings, broken arms, robbery and murder
of comrades; they were 'conscripted'- after imprisonment in makeshift jails 'built of thorn
trees with big poisonous thorns pointing inwards', and torture on Island hideouts. Small
wonder that in the eyes of shocked reporters, 'press-gang procedure' paled before the
grim battles for labour being fought on lonely terrain stretching well into neighbouring
colonies.60
If the press-gangs of capitalist accumulation were bloodier than before, procuring
forced workers was also more profitable. By 1947, foreign black runners raked-off 12s.
a head - five times more than ten years earlier - and white recruiters creamed half as
much again. But since both regarded seizing and selling Africans in the same light as
"n boer sy mielies groei en teen markwaarde verkoop', they flogged their merchandise
to the highest bidder.61 And at a market price of around L3, the wealthiest landlords
were cornering the alien 'joinboys'. To the dismay of the Boerearbeidsvereniging, the
mushroom groups of black-listed farmers were carrying off their human cargoes by the
lorryload, supplying plenteous labour to Rand industrialists as well as to eastern
Transvaal members. Merchant-farmers had extended their portfolios: selling black
bodies had become big business.
Not surprisingly, smaller landlords in the eastern and northern Transvaal were denounc-
ing recruiting as a racket which had reached its 'toppunt van onreelmatlghede'.63
Understandably, officialdom was also Increasingly restive about 'black slave traffic on
a grand scale'. Under the whip of this crisis on its borders - and the spur of broader
struggles to secure workers - the state reformulated its policies towards procuring farm
labour.
THE FARM LABOUR SCHEMES OF THE 1940s
Between 1944 and 1948, the Foreign Farm Labour Scheme evolved through close
co-operation between the NAD and a Liaison Committee of the SAAU, institutionalized
in meetings that included the President of the SAAU, the Chairman of the Transvaal
Agricultural Union and the Secretary of Native Affairs. This 'very intimate relationship'
began with a 1944 flirtation intended to find extra-Parliamentary solutions to the farm
labour shortage.65 But the partners rapidly established their compatibility when tackling
the fundamental issue - the SAAU's insistence on dividing Africans into full-time farm
and industrial workers. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Secretary of Native Affairs
was delighted, the Minister of Native Affairs enthused, the Prime Minister gave his stamp
of approval. (To their mutual surprise, even Nationalists raised no objections in
Parliament.66) Having established that the state would proceed experimentally on the
issue - officialdom feared that classifying part the African population as permanent
urban dwellers was far In advance of (white) public opinion and would undermine
segregation - the partners began discussing state siphoning of labour to farms.
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Here rather more compromise was necessary. As in all capitalist societies, bureaucrats
were reluctant to identify themselves too closely with crises in any one sector. In South
Africa at that time, an additional deterrent was the crippling shortage of workers on the
mines. Yet 'the content of "relative autonomy" was subject to continual 'redefinition in
response to crises'.67 In particular, if black South Africans could not be funnelled to
farmers alone, both black and white foreigners had long been another matter. A9
farmers' wartime bonanza of Italian prisoners- of-war drew to an end - and as officers
flowing back to their offices tightened influx control in the immediate post-war recession
- black Immigrants resurfaced as obvious victims for conscription onto farms.68 As the
Minister of Native Affairs bluntly declared, 'We cannot force Union Natives to work on
the farms but we can force Natives illegally In the country to work on the farms.'69
If Pact was dead, long live its policy - with some appropriate modifications. First, this
was social engineering on a grand scale. The scheme could potentially embrace some
two hundred thousand 'tropicals' already In the country - the vast majority living illegally
in urban areas - as well as 24-30,000 clandestine immigrants per year. Second, a rough
index of hegemony had to be constructed, as claimants to this pool of labour had
multiplied since the 1920s. Crudely balancing profits against paternalism, officialdom
determined that only Transvaal and Free State farmers would receive foreigners:
Immigrants deprived of a minimum wage would thus be protected from devoting more
than 25% of their pay to travel. To the alarm of administrators, landlords on the Liaison
Committee dictated which base metal mine qualified for how much of 'their' foreign
labour. But to the relief of both partners, urban Industry was excluded from this bizarre
parlour game. Despite the protests of organized manufacturing, the NAD refused to
'bind itself to consult the South African Federated Chamber of Industries before it
decides on a general policy for dealing with foreign Natives.'70
The NAD had, however, bound itself to the SAAU, and this confllctual union required
yet another, fatal compromise. For many officials, a state monopoly over foreign
labourers would suppress the slave trade and soothe northern governments; for most
capitalists, ft would undercut labour companies demanding spiralling fees. Yet farmers'
representatives had an additional concern, since their constituencies contained In-
creasing numbers who profited from the 'selling and buying of human bodies.'7' As
the election loomed, members of the Liaison Committee anxiously advised against legal
control of the 'groups', since this would 'set the farming community by the ears.'72 And
when Bethal landlords were threatened with a labour boycott after yet another scandal,
apparatchiks who proclaimed their 'stand for private enterprise' prevailed.73 Since civil
servants could not guarantee an adequate supply of foreign workers to a district
pre-eminent for both abuse and production, recruiters had to be allowed to continue
with coercion.
In the official scheme, violence was bureaucratized, as administrators and farmers
infused their project with mementoes of the war, and with memories of the efficacy of
massive state intervention In civil society. Starving and ragged immigrants who had
traversed half of Africa would cook in trenches, sleep in tents, and wear second hand
military attire; they would be deverminised by pumping 'DDT powder up the trouser
legs', and would peer at the outside world through massive security fences.74 Those
detained in urban areas would be imprisoned in depots with padlocked doors; if they
declined the discipline of the farms, they would be deported back to the border In troop
carriers. As these precautions suggested, officialdom was all too aware of the violence
entailed in conscripting foreign labourers to save domestic capitalists.
The offensive commenced in early 1947. Since little could be done about recruiters in
the 'zone', the centre of gravity shifted to the urban areas of the Free State and
Transvaal. After some months of sabre-rattling - only law-abiding foreigners who
reported to pass offices were detained - the blitzkrieg began. All northerners in this
region - with exceptions such as 'the Portuguese', those on the mines and all who had
worked some six years for one employer - were to 'be rounded up" by the police.75 The
NAD was anxious to clear the towns of foreigners - an estimated 135,000 of whom were
employed on the Witwatersrand alone. Urban industrialists, according to this Orwellian
vision, would then rely only on a stable workforce of South Africans; state expenditure
on urban blacks would not have to stretch to cover alien immigrants; the depots would
function as labour bureaux bombarding rural capitalists with workers.76
But the best laid plans can go astray. A year after its inauguration - after the lives of
tens of thousands of alien blacks had been disrupted, thousands of white householders
had lost their domestic servants, hundreds of employers had been prosecuted for
illegally employing foreign labour, tens of mines and recruiting companies had been
antagonized, and 'a hornet's nest' had been stirred up with northern authorities - the
Farm Labour Scheme had siphoned about 1,200 workers to landlords. Each cost the
state some i.140 a head. Mothered by myopia, fathered by compromise, and
delivered by coercion, the Farm Labour Scheme was stillborn.
To the bewilderment of bureaucrats, a major reason for its failure was the enormous
resistance it provoked. In urban areas, many foreigners were 'driven underground':
they moved to the outskirts of towns, or redefined themselves as residents of the
Protectorates or South Africa.78 If caught in the dragnet, those reluctant to sacrifice
national identity to personal emergency 'made the most stupendous efforts to get
away'. They bribed guards, broke out of cells, abseiled down walls with torn-up
blankets, and 'refused entirely to go to farms.'79 About 90% of those who initially failed
to escape chose deportation over farms; of the 4.000 who travelled back in troop
carriers, many fled at the Louis Trichardt depot. Finally, those dumped on the banks of
the Limpopo could make their way back to the Rand in a couple of weeks - provided
they evaded prowling recruiters.
On the border, runners and resistance were equally effective in smashing the scheme.
At the Umpopo subdepots, most immigrants easily evaded the tiny African staff armed
only with pedal cycles and with no pecuniary interest in their capture. Some were guided
by Mozambicans and claimed 'Portuguese' origins; others 'pulled hatchets and long
knives and knobkerries and said if this man is a Policeman or inspector we will kill him.
Moreover, there were hundreds of ways of evading the Louis Trichardt 'konsenlrasie
kamp'.lts tents accommodated only 'a few stray ones who had been missed out' by
recruiters; they were often ill or crippled, and all obdurately refused to go to Bethal Not
surprisingly, northern Transvaal staff spent most of their time 'waiting, like Mr Micawber,
for something to turn up'.81
What of the tiny minority shanghaied to farms? Certainly a handful of ex-customers of
Pact's labour bureau purchased workers. On the aptly named 'Straflontein', one of the
largest of these landlords fed immigrants on porridge left over by horses, and sardined
them into a windowless compound so squalid that it outstripped 'notorious jails, slums
and refugee camps in the Far East, England and Africa'. Although the compound was
locked and guarded at night, ten out of twenty-five of these foreigners had deserted
within two weeks - perhaps having learnt that other workers had not been paid for five
months.82 fn general, the scheme suffered from an extremely high desertion rate; since
the fee was also exorbitant, the vast majority of farmers displayed no interest in the
Farm Labour Scheme's wares. Although pecuniary concessions were quickly made,
the scheme was already doomed.
Most bureaucrats, however, thought they had been defeated not by 'tropicals' but by
touts determined 'to retain their hold on their trade in human beings.'83 Undoubtedly,
these merchants of men were enormously hostile. They feared they would be forced
out of business, they declared; the decreased 'turnover' would ensure that recruiting
South Africans alone for farm labour would be unprofitable. Consequently, they grimly
deployed their sanguinary talents to ensure that 'one man will go out. That man is the
Government.'84 And private enterprise quickly proved its predatory potential: the
subdepots were closed in late 1948, and the entire scheme was wound up in 1949.
It did, however, spawn a much more effective successor. South African blacks were
also loaded into the vans of police rounding up foreigners - and from September 1947,
at the Johannesurg Native Commissioner's court which processed black pass offen-
ders through the grinder of white injustice, they were channelled into the 'Farm Labour
Scheme: Union'. Ostensibly, this was the brainchild of a minor NAD bureaucrat with
Bethal links ('Oom Piet', as he was termed by Transvaal farmers plying him with whisky
and cigars.) From the start, however, he displayed enthusiasm beyond the call of duty
in initiating a brutal system of forced labour which had long been the dream of the
director of the Boerearbeidsvereniging. Within less than a year, this association had no
qualms about claiming both Piet de Beer and the Johannesburg Native Commissioner
as its own labour agents.85
Thus the court was the nerve centre of a ruthless recruiting system: the victims were
blacks, the runners were white police armed with kwela-kwela vans, the labour agents
doubled as state officials with an arsenal of punitive powers, and the buyers were
sunburnt farmers waiting in Oom Piet's office for their 'bag of boys'.66 Unlike seasoned
foreigners, unsophisticated rural Africans new both to eGoll and to jail were particularly
vulnerable. They were first captured and charged for allegedly breaking the law by the
police, then disgorged In a fenced yard guarded by the forces of law and order. Then
the 'prisoner's friend', Oom Piet, sauntered out - as the self-proclaimed director of public
prosecutions, he presumed (quite correctly) that imprisonment awaited the recalci-
trant.87 They could be jailed for years, he informed them; they could be hired out
involuntarily to farmers under the UP's 'nege-pennies-bandiet-skema'; or they could
'volunteer' for the farms at nearly double this wage for six months and their cases would
be withdrawn. By April 1948, over two thousand South African blacks had 'chosen' the
farms; one fifth had descended straight into the maws of the Boerearbeidsvereniging.88
Far from condemning the scheme, the Secretary of Native Affairs was 'much Im-
pressed'; the Director of Native Labour was jubilant.89 A corrupt project based on
primeval economics and barbaric law had two major advantages: it cost almost nothing,
and it funnelled more labour to the farms in eight months than did the foreign Farm
Labour Scheme throughout its existence. For agrarian capital, the greatest attraction
lay in the absence of capitation fees, which meant an immediate saving of 15 per worker.
Furthermore, the supply was assured: almost any weekday, and sometimes several
times a month, those close to Johannesburg could simply drive to town and load
labourers onto their lorries. By mid-1948. Oom Piet's customers were predominantly
the richest and most influential highveld farmers. Many who had bought workers from
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Pact's labour bureau in the 1920s, or from child labour recruiters in the 1930s, or from
'groups' slavetrading on the border in the 1940s, enthusiastically turned to completely
free forced labour.
Like recruiting, exploitation was still shaped by 'the dominance of the strong...the
standards of commerce, the maximum-profit motive'.90 By the 1940s, a tiny white
minority had risen to the realms of prosperity by extorting maximum work for minimum
cost from tens of thousands of black recruits. Labourers, recalled a tenant on Lazarus's
farm, 'could not finish working'; in the tractor boom after the war, 'you did more work
per day.'91 All over the eastern Transvaal, recruits spent fourteen hour days bent double
scooping up potatoes with their bare hands. Many were still paid in second-hand
garments; most now wore potato sacks after their clothes had been confiscated.
Invariably, they were robbed, sodomized or assaulted by black 'boss-boys' and white
foremen. All slept 'morsdood' in locked compounds which were 'the place of pigs'; at
night, some urinated on the floors, if there was not the dubious benefit of a 'a 2" pipe
struck through the wall'. 'We purely taken to captivity for six month', cried some; 'we
are working like prisoners', cried others; 'We are suffering hell' cried all.92
Yet from the 1920s to the 1940s, the NAD appeared reluctant 'to take any strong action
in the matter, to take any action at all in fact'. The logic of lethargy was brutally simple.
Without forced labour in the eastern Transvaal, no large rural capitalists; without large
rural capitalists, only meagre amounts of marketed maize and potatoes from one of the
greatest food- producing regions in the country. For large capital which had penetrated
the backward countryside from 'the outside', for 'boerende boere' spreading their
wings in the wartime boom, for regimes overseeing the uneven spread of capitalism
before primitive accumulation had run its course, forced labour in the eastern Transvaal
was an 'anomalous necessity'.94
In 1947, this lesson was hammered home to the United Party government. As fears of
a labour boycott surfaced after the scandal that year, a handful of murderous Bethal
foremen and farmers were prosecuted in an attempt to regulate the self- destructive
tendencies of capital. But the state retreated with unseemly haste before a storm of
protest unleashed by farmers linked to the Boerearbeidsvereniging. Despite yet another
scheme to reduce the labour shortage - allowing Bethal capitalists to build their own
rural jails heralded the boom in black prison labour in the 1950s - the political damage
had been done. By trying to systematize the use and abuse of forced labour, the state
had 'antagonized the "platteland" vote and especially that of the farmers in the Eastern
Transvaal'.95 With some justification, many contemporary observers regarded this
penetration of the sphere of exploitation as responsible for driving many Afrikaans-
speakers into the Nationalist camp in the Transvaal.96 Far from state inertia on the
question of agrarian capital's labour shortage, a frenzied final assault on the problem
had facilitated the victory of apartheid in 1948.
CONCLUSION
Unlike God, historians can alter the past. If the history of state intervention in the farm
labour crisis were to be revised, then a tale turned topsy-turvy might compel attention,
and even yield some durable insights.
Consider the following account. Capitalist farmers had experienced a labour shortage
for decades - uneven development nationally and internationally produced appalling
conditions absolutely incapable of attracting sufficient cheap wage workers. When the
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NAD tackled this problem In the 1920s, it adhered to the principle that the bodies of
blacks had exchange value, and supported farm labour recruiting companies operating
a system in which 'a person was one pound ten'.97 It also heeded the South African
belief that child labour should be channelled to agriculture, and subscribed to the
worldwide ethic that foreign workers could be shunted to jobs spurned by indigenous
labourers. During the boom of the later 1920s, a labour bureau sold alien blacks to
farmers at a substantial profit, having first cheapened the value of their labour-power.
During the depression, the state sold the labour-power of short term prisoners to larger
landlords for its own financial benefit. But in urban booms of the later 1930s and '40s,
convicts were diverted to public works, and ever more rural South Africans fled to towns.
Among the farmers worst affected were those in the eastern Transvaal, where convicts
and child labour had been particularly important. Anxiously, these 'cheque book'
landlords demanded and received renewed rights to recruit foreigners.
In the 1940s, the NAD cold-shouldered the 'large majority of farmers [who] do not aspire
to money-making as a vocation', but eagerly embraced big agrarian capital.96 As the
acid of profit-making eroded the veneer of paternalism, it cynically tolerated a slave
trade on the border which drained labour from smaller landlords, and welcomed the
SAAU's proposal of permanently dividing the African population into rural and urban
full-time workers. During the wartime and post-war agrarian booms, the NAD and larger
rural capitalists worked hand in hand on mass forced labour schemes. Since channell-
ing criminals to farmers was established practice, hi|acking huge numbers of lawbreak-
ing foreigners and black South Africans to rural estates was but a post-war corollary to
a peacetime theorem.
Unfortunately, the most ambitious joint scheme was spectacularly wrecked on the twin
rocks of recruiters' resilience and black resistance. Furthermore, when the state tried
to regulate the suicidal tendencies of large capital, the government lost support which
facilitated its loss of power in 1948. Nonetheless, significant progress had been made
in addressing the labour shortage of larger capitalist farmers. Thus the UP administra-
tion endowed its successor with an agrarian sector which had 'become more and more
dependent on foreign labour'.99 It also bequeathed to apartheid a slave trade on the
border, a forced labour system in the heartland of South Africa, farmer-owned jails in
the centres of.agrarian capitalism, and the 'nege-pennies-bandiet-skema' throughout
the land.
Almost immediately, the apartheid state implemented policies gingerly skirted by its
precursor for fear of alienating large capitalist farmers. In 1949, legislation was amended
to control the slave trade conducted by 'cheque-book' landlords; SAAU representatives
were warned that this was 'not a mattervfor decision by the farmers'; private recruiters
serving the minority were increasingly subordinated to labour bureaux serving the
majority.100 But the apartheid regime had as little success as its predecessors in
eliminating farm labour shortages via these bureaux. Far more significant for large
capital was the expansion of its precursor's schemes affecting prohibited immigrants,
prisoners and 'petty offenders'. If large Transvaal landlords no longer cried 'labour
shortage' in the late 1950s, this was mainly because foreign recruits had been undercut
by 'ons eie surplus stedelike Naturelle', driven out of the countryside by the quickening
pace of primitive accumulation, and coerced back onto farms through a gulag archipe-
lago of forced labour schemes.101 If this was a turning point for big Transvaal capital,
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then its origins lay in the wartime boom, as ever more indigenous blacks were
proletarianized, and as the UP regime introduced the coercive schemes subsequently
appropriated by apartheid.
This story, of course, still contains silences and sophisms, since it omits the fate of small
landlords largely dependent on labour tenants, and draws heavily on eastern Transvaal
evidence. Nonetheless, it has three advantages for historians. First, it disaggregates
farmers. Although scholars of earlier periods are increasingly stressing the role of
'progressive' landlords linked to non-agrarian capital, later rural history has often been
perceived through the prism of the neo-classical categories of 'agriculture', 'mining'
and 'manufacturing'. A more concerted conceptual shift - towards the conflicts between
monopoly and small-scale capital, towards the links between merchant, financial and
productive capital • is perhaps overdue.
Second, it relieves scholars from the burden of explaining extremely eccentric states.
Pre-1948 regimes did not subsidize agriculture massively, yet refuse to intervene on
the labour issue. On the contrary: officials took extremely seriously one of their most
fundamental functions - the 'use of state power to create and sustain capitalist relations
of production with an adequate, stable and docile supply of labour.'1 In practice as
opposed to pronouncements, they also retained the visible hand of coercion so long
as the invisible hand of the market was manacled by incomplete primitive accumulation.
Third, as David Yudelman has persuasively argued for an earlier period, 'the modern
South African state has to be periodized in an entirely different way' from that suggested
by much of the existing historiography.103 Governments could and did propose. But
under both the Pact and the UP regimes, was not the legislature repeatedly flouted?
Were not immigration clamps constantly prised apart by white capital and black aliens?
Was not the state-allocated workforce commandeered by large farmers? Did not labour
schemes collapse ignominiously under the impact of resistance? Were not state policies
profoundly affected by booms and slumps? In the long run, the harsh rhythms of capital
accumulation and struggle were the ultimate determinants of state policy on the ground,
not the political gyrations of barbarous governments.
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